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In this paper we investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the 
dynamics of decentralization in parliamentary democracies. We contend that decentralization 
processes are endogenous to legislative bargaining by political parties. For that purpose we 
construct a new index of the Parliamentary Saliency for Decentralization (PSD) that reflects 
the distribution of parties’ preferences for decentralization weighted by their legislative 
bargaining power. Recent research has emphasized the role of structural determinants of 
decentralization such as inter-regional inequality and ethno-linguistic diversity. However, we 
argue that the legislative bargaining by political parties is crucial to understand the dynamics 
of decentralization. Our main hypothesis is that –holding structural determinants constant– the 
greater the legislative bargaining power of parties with decentralization demands, the more 
likely decentralization reforms will occur. We test our hypotheses with dynamic models for 
19 OECD parliamentary democracies by using Comparative Manifesto (CMP) data and the 
Regional Authority Index (RAI). We find evidence that, indeed, the dynamics of 
decentralization in parliamentary democracies are crucially shaped by legislative bargaining. 
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Introduction 
When and why decentralization reforms take place in parliamentary democracies? 
This question can be understood as a particular reformulation of the well-known “who gets 
what, when, and how?” by Harold Lasswell (1936). This article provides an answer to the first 
question by focusing on how particular compositions of national parliaments affect 
decentralization reforms. What we mean by a particular configuration of the legislative is the 
distribution of seats among parties with different preferences for and against decentralization 
in a given legislature. By decentralization reforms we refer to changes in the distribution of 
political and fiscal authority between the central and the regional entities. In other words, we 
seek to provide an empirical test of the political mechanism that links the configuration of 
national parliaments with the adoption of decentralization reforms that increase (or decrease) 
regional authority. 
Decentralization has been a widespread phenomenon in many countries over the last 
decades, and not only in developing countries but also in advanced democracies (Treisman 
2007). However, many previous studies aimed at explaining decentralization levels and not 
decentralization dynamics (Beramendi 2007b, Treisman 2006, Erk and Koning 2010). Most 
of these works have emphasized the role of structural factors such as inter-regional inequality 
and ethno-linguistic diversity. But decentralization during the last 50 years has been a process 
whereby levels of authority of the subnational entities have been changing over time –in some 
countries in rather dramatic forms. Unfortunately, structural factors provide limited insight 
into such dynamic processes. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on particular institutional 
constraints and political incentives to provide more nuanced explanations for such dynamic 
processes. Our contribution here is to focus on the legislative politics associated with dynamic 
changes in decentralization. 
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Simply put, our argument is that the composition of the legislative arena in 
parliamentary democracies is crucial to understand changes in the distribution of political 
authority between the centre and the regions. We argue that the specific distribution of 
political parties’ preferences and legislative bargaining power is a key determinant of 
dynamic changes in decentralization. By considering insights from both the legislative 
bargaining literature (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Baron and Diermeier 2001) and the 
endogenous decentralization literature (Filippov et al. 2004, Beramendi 2012) we contend that 
in parliamentary democracies decentralization dynamics are endogenous processes subject to 
legislative bargaining by political parties.  
Our contribution highlights the role of a specific institutional arena, namely the 
legislative, as the place in which political parties bargain and modify the distribution of 
political and fiscal authority. We argue that the actual distribution of political parties’ 
preferences and bargaining power acts as an institutional constraint for the political will to 
modify how the centre and the regions share political authority. That is, we assume that any 
given party bargains in the legislative over decentralization subject to the distribution of 
preferences for decentralization and bargaining power of other parties. This is a rather 
obvious theoretical proposition that nonetheless has non-trivial empirical implications, 
namely the need to understand (and measure) the characteristics of legislative bargaining in 
parliamentary democracies in order to shed light on the nature of decentralization processes. 
To test our hypotheses we construct an index of what we refer to as the degree of 
Parliamentary Saliency for Decentralization (PSD) that reflects the distribution of parties’ 
preferences for decentralization weighted by their legislative bargaining power in each 
legislature. We collected data for 19 OECD parliamentary democracies over the period 1950-
2006. To construct this index we use Comparative Manifesto (CMP) data that provides time-
varying information about parties’ preferences regarding decentralization of political 
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authority. On the other hand, we take advantage of the Regional Authority Index recently 
gathered by Hooghe et al. (2010) and therefore we conceptualize decentralization as a 
measure of the distribution of political power between the central and the regional authorities 
–which includes both fiscal and political competences. 
 
Theory: Mechanisms Behind the Dynamics of Decentralization 
Endogenous Decentralization: Theoretical Perspectives   
There is a vast body of literature that uses decentralization as the main independent 
variable of interest to study its effects on all sorts of outcomes (Rodden and Wibbels 2002, 
Wibbels 2006). Over the recent years, though, many scholars have pointed out the need to 
endogenize decentralization and uncover its political determinants (Wibbels 2006, Beramendi 
2007b). This effort is well justified as long as we are interested in claiming exogenous effects 
of decentralization. As Beramendi (2007b) highlights: “insofar as federal institutions 
reproduce the underlying tastes of the relevant political coalitions, they do not really matter 
per se”.1 In fact, this debate echoes an old remark formulated by Riker (1969): does 
federalism (and decentralization) have independent effects or it is rather an institutional 
outcome endogenous to the political preferences of the relevant political actors? If the latter is 
true then understanding the strategic incentives and institutional constraints under which the 
main political actors operate becomes essential. 
  The literature on endogenous decentralization has tended to focus on structural 
determinants, specially the empirical contributions (Panizza 1999, Treisman 2006, Erk and 
Koning 2010, Hooghe et al. 2008, 2010). Panizza (1999) highlighted the role of four main 
covariates associated with fiscal decentralization: land area, GDP per capita, ethnic 
1 The author refers to federal institutions but exactly the same logic applies when thinking about endogenous 
decentralization.  
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fractionalization, and democratic history. On the other hand, Treisman (2006, 2007) 
underscored the role of economic development, country size, and colonial history but did not 
find statistical evidence for ethnic diversity and democracy being associated with fiscal 
decentralization. However, the evidence provided by these studies is often times inconclusive, 
either because the sample of countries varies from one study to another or due to 
methodological concerns. And even more importantly, a common concern with these large-N 
cross-country empirical studies is the lack of attention to the political incentives and 
institutional constraints (Rodden 2004). 
According to Hooghe et al. (2008), political authority of regional governments 
increased in most OECD countries between 1950 and 2006. Supply-side explanations of this 
gradual process of political decentralization are the absence of external threats, the global 
integration, pressures from international markets, and, last but not least, a functional logic of 
devolution intended to satisfy preference heterogeneity within countries (Erk and Swenden 
2009). From a political-economy perspective, the works of Bolton and Roland (1997), 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and Beramendi (2007a) put the relation between distributive 
outcomes, inequality, and political and fiscal decentralization at the centre of the analysis. The 
main insight of this research is that understanding how the territorial distribution of income 
shapes individual preferences is fundamental to correctly account for the design of 
decentralized systems.  
More recently, Erk and Koning (2010) have put forward a new structuralist approach 
for explaining institutional changes that takes into account the interaction between the social 
structure and the political mobilization of interest groups. They argue that in those 
heterogeneous countries with territorially concentrated linguistic groups –such as Spain or 
Belgium– political mobilization along linguistic lines should exert pressure for deepening 
fiscal decentralization. Conversely, in homogeneous federations without such political 
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pressures, the tendency should be towards fiscal and institutional centralization. The approach 
by Erk and Koning (2010) is appealing but lacks a discussion of the institutional channels 
through which the demands of mobilized interest groups will be more or less successful. Even 
if it is true that structural factors are the main determinants of long-term institutional 
equilibriums, a study of the strategic incentives and institutional constraints is needed to 
account for the dynamics of decentralization.  
Therefore, structural explanations of endogenous decentralization seem to be ill-
equipped for providing an explanation that accounts for when and why decentralization 
reforms occur. Too often structural determinants have been assumed to work in a political 
vacuum when in fact decentralization is fundamentally a political outcome. Hence, the lack of 
a well-specified political mechanism becomes a hurdle to answer both the when and why 
questions. Instead, this paper conceives the process of decentralization in a parliamentary 
democracy as being endogenous to legislative bargaining by political parties. In other words, 
we contend that political incentives in a particular institutional scenario play a crucial role in 
explaining the dynamics of decentralization.  
The Role of Political Parties and Legislative Politics 
As said, we argue that it is necessary to bring politics back into the study of 
endogenous decentralization and go beyond structural explanations. In that sense, our 
approach is more related to the literature on the evolution of decentralization and party 
systems (Riker 1964, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Brancati 2008, Swenden and Maddens 
2009). This literature, however, is inconclusive with respect to the direction of causality 
linking party systems and decentralization.2 On the one hand, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) 
argue that it is the architecture of the state what drives the degree of party system 
2 See Amat et al. (2009) for a discussion of the relationship between the characteristics of the party system and 
the dynamics of decentralization. 
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nationalization. One of their main insights is that regional parties will be more powerful the 
greater the degree of political authority at the subnational level. Similarly, Brancati (2008) has 
shown that the strength of regional parties increases with political decentralization.  
On the other hand, and more in line with the argument presented here, Riker (1964) 
claimed that it is the structure of political parties what drives decentralization. Likewise, 
Filippov et al. (2004) argued that the stability of a federal contract is a function of a political 
conflict between political elites. They claim that the strategic incentives of electorally 
motivated political parties are the main source of stability in a given federation. If the 
structure of the party system is horizontally and vertically integrated institutions will be 
endogenously self-enforcing, whereas if electoral competition becomes fragmented territorial 
conflicts will emerge that will end up disrupting the core constitutional rules. Thus, the 
structure of the party system and electoral competition is the political mechanism that 
ultimately links the society’s composition with changes in institutional outcomes. 
Interestingly, recent studies like Lago-Peñas et al. (2009) and Beramendi (2012) have studied 
the relationship between the characteristics of the party system and the implementation of 
fiscal policies and decentralization of redistribution.  
However, none of the studies on party systems and decentralization have focused on 
the specific institutional arenas in which political parties actually bargain to modify the 
distribution of political and fiscal authority at the regional level. That is the main reason why 
most of these works provide a political mechanism for why we should observe 
decentralization but still not a good reasoning about when those outcomes are likely to be 
implemented. In fact, studies like Caramani (2004) and Chhibber and Kollman (2004) 
undertake broad comparative historical approaches that highlight long-term trends in the 
evolution of party systems but at the cost of a more detailed analysis of the strategic 
incentives of political parties. Alternatively, Filippov et al. (2004) focus on parties’ strategic 
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incentives but not on the actual institutional constraints that condition the ability of political 
parties to alter the rules of the game.  
In this paper we argue that our understanding of when and why decentralization 
reforms are implemented can be improved by focusing on the distribution of seats among 
parties and their bargaining power in the legislature. In parliamentary democracies coalition 
and minority governments are the norm rather than the exception. As Müller and Strom 
(2000: 2-3) pointed out: “in the great majority of Western European states, coalition politics is 
at least an occasional occurrence, and often the order of the day”. But unfortunately, the 
literature on the political economy of decentralization has made extensive use of electoral 
competition models that assume unitary incumbents.3 However, in parliamentary 
democracies, coalition and minority governments reflect the preferences of more than one 
party (Baron and Diermeier 2001). This is because the confidence of a legislative majority is 
needed to sustain the executive government in place. Therefore policy outcomes like 
decentralization are the result of legislative bargaining among disciplined parties that form a 
legislative majority. In other words, the actual composition of the legislative becomes a key 
variable to understand when and why bills are passed. 
Very much in line with this argument, Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) argue that in 
India the shift from an era of majoritarian dominance by the Congress Party towards a new 
scenario of coalition politics implied a change in the patterns of distributive politics. They 
present empirical evidence according to which a legislative bargaining model is helpful to 
understand the patterns of fiscal transfers in India during the post 1996 period. More recently, 
Rodden and Dragu (forthcoming) have analysed the role of territorial representation to 
explain levels of inter-regional redistribution across federations. They present a legislative 
bargaining model in which regional representatives form minimal winning coalitions and 
3 A reference that assumes a unitary incumbent which is very often used in the political economy literature on 
intergovernmental transfers is Dixit and Londregan (1996). 
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decide over redistributive outcomes. However, the model they discuss is not appropriate for 
parliamentary democracies, where political parties are the main agenda-setters and act in a 
disciplined manner. 
Our Contribution and Empirical Implications 
In conclusion, legislative bargaining has received surprisingly little attention when 
studying the political determinants of decentralization –notwithstanding the recent efforts 
made by Rodden and Dragu (forthcoming). Given that decentralization is first and foremost a 
political outcome, one would expect legislative politics to play a relevant role in explaining 
the dynamics of decentralization. Beyond the importance of the vertical bargaining between 
national and subnational elites that previous research has emphasized, we claim that political 
bargaining over decentralization also takes place at the national level separately –namely, in 
national parliaments. At the end of the day it is within legislatures that political measures are 
decided upon. And this is particularly the case in parliamentary democracies. 
We know that legislatures matter for policy outcomes. The formal theoretical study of 
bargaining within legislatures dates back to the seminal article of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
The implications of theirs and subsequent works in the same vein go mainly in two directions. 
First, the decision-making rules in the legislature (e.g. open vs. closed rules) provide more or 
less advantages for certain parties. Second, and more generally, the specific distribution of 
parties’ preferences and power make a huge difference to understand which will be the likely 
political outcomes in a given parliament (Axelrod 1970). The latter determines, among others, 
government formation. When one party alone gets the electoral votes necessary to reach the 
absolute majority of seats, the most likely formation is a single-party majority government 
where the party will be able to push policies towards her ideal point. By contrast, if no party 
beats the 50% seat share threshold then a coalition or a single-party minority cabinet has to 
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form. That of course will influence the policies implemented depending on the preferences 
and power of each bargaining party. 
The causal chain we defend, though, is one in which the configuration of parliaments 
is the key independent variable we should pay more attention to. Obviously, the executive 
will be the branch making policies, but in parliamentary democracies governments’ policy-
making and survival is inextricably linked to the confidence of the legislative. Therefore, the 
composition of the legislature is what determines government formation and, above all, how 
this government will operate and which policies will be allowed to pass. The main scenario 
giving birth to the actors that will eventually decide upon policies is, hence, the parliament. 
And decentralization policy is no exception.4 
In sum, in this paper we claim that getting to know the specific configuration of the 
legislative arena will improve our understanding of when and why decentralization reforms 
are adopted. We thus expect legislative bargaining at the national level to account for a 
substantial part of unexplained variation in decentralization processes, notwithstanding all the 
structural determinants that have been said to explain decentralization outcomes –that is, 
keeping these factors constant. 
First, everything else the same, we should expect a parliament preferring 
decentralization more intensely to be more likely to pass legislative reforms giving more 
power to regional entities. Second, we contend that the situation in which political parties find 
themselves to negotiate policies –namely, their legislative bargaining power– will be crucial 
to understand the dynamics of political decentralization. Even small changes in the 
4 As an illustration of this point, we could imagine a situation in which a two-party coalition cabinet has formed 
between a pro-centralization and a pro-decentralization party. If this coalition was surplus in the sense that the 
latter was unnecessary to guarantee the government’s investiture and the former already held the absolute 
majority of seats, we would predict that the prospects for decentralization would be the same as if a former’s 
single-party cabinet had formed. The key factor is thus the legislative configuration more than the executive’s, 
and that applies regardless of the type of cabinet that is formed. 
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distribution of forces within the legislature affecting the negotiation position of parties could 
greatly shift the prospects of decentralization reforms. This is why parties’ bargaining power 
is the key variable determining parliaments’ salience for political decentralization. 
To sum up, the main hypotheses to be tested in this article are the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (Legislative Bargaining Effect): An increase in the Parliamentary 
Salience for Decentralization (PSD) weighted by the legislative bargaining power 
induces a change in decentralization of political and fiscal powers from the central to 
the regional authorities. 
Hypothesis 2 (Legislative Bargaining versus Alternative Measures):  The measure of 
Parliamentary Salience for Decentralization (PSD) weighted by the legislative 
bargaining power outperforms both the absolute and the seat share weighted 
measures in explaining decentralization processes. 
 
Data and Variables 
For the empirical analyses we focus on 19 OECD parliamentary democracies over the 
time-period 1950-2006. By narrowing down our sample of countries and using cross-section 
time-series data we are able to test our hypotheses for a coherent set of countries and avoid 
common criticisms of previous empirical literature (Rodden 2004). Namely, we overcome the 
problems associated with large N cross-country studies by exploiting only within-country 
variation for a reduced number of countries for which we have well-defined theoretical 
expectations. The 19 countries under study are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
We gathered data coming from different sources. On the one hand we use the 
“Regional Authority Index (RAI)” by Hooghe et al. (2010) as our dependent variable 
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(although we disaggregate its two main components in some analyses). On the other hand, we 
collected data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (for details see Budge et al. 2001) to 
construct our main independent variable of interest: the Parliamentary Salience for 
Decentralization (PSD). Other sources were used for the control variables. 
Dependent Variable: Political Decentralization 
Since our argument has mainly a political nature, namely focusing on legislative 
bargaining as a main political determinant of decentralization, we need to choose the measure 
of decentralization that fits best the specific purposes of our investigation (Stegarescu 2004). 
We are interested in a codification of decentralization that distinguishes the political power of 
central versus regional governments and at the same time qualifies the size and scope of 
regional authority. The former is crucial since our theoretical expectation is that parties with 
strong preferences for decentralization will bargain for an alteration of the status quo in the 
distribution of power between the centre and the regions. Also, we are interested in 
disentangling the nature of decentralization reforms. All in all, we believe that the data 
recently collected by Hooghe et al. (2010) constitutes the best index currently available for 
our purposes. 
Hooghe et al. (2010) developed an index that measures regional authority in 42 
developed democracies for the period 1950-2006. The “Regional Authority Index” (RAI) is an 
additive index of a variety of indicators that codify the extent to which regional authorities 
enjoy political power. Specifically, they define a regional government as “a coherent 
territorial entity situated between local and national levels with a capacity for authoritative 
decision making”. They conceive regional authority in two main scales that add up into a 
single index. On the one hand “Self-Rule” codifies the extent to which regional governments 
can make autonomous decisions over the citizens living in the region. On the other hand, 
“Shared-Rule” measures to what extent regional governments co-exercise authority with 
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central governments. Each of these two main dimensions contains further indicators that 
describe various institutional arrangements.5 Hence, one of the advantages of the RAI index is 
the possibility to distinguish Self-Rule from Shared-Ruled when studying regional authority. 
Some of the analyses below are run separately for each dimension of RAI to study if 
legislative bargaining affects them differently.  
The RAI index sums Self-Rule and Shared-Rule scores and ranges in a continuous 
scale from 1 to 24. To illustrate the behaviour of RAI, Spain is an interesting country as it has 
experienced numerous decentralization reforms over the period 1978-2006. Spain scored 10 
points in 1978 but reached 22.1 already in 1997. Looking at the RAI components, the main 
source behind this change was a dramatic increase in the Self-Rule of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities, which climbed from 8.0 to 19.1 points during this period. The 
RAI index also increased significantly in many other countries in the sample. In Italy it grows 
from 8.5 to 22.7 between 1950 and 2006; in Belgium it rises from 14 points to 28.1 over the 
same years whereas in Ireland it goes from 0 to 6. Most of these increases followed gradual 
processes of decentralization reforms and most of them primarily affected the Self-Rule 
dimension of the RAI index. 
It also bears mentioning that the RAI index behaves very coherently when compared 
to other decentralization measures widely used in previous literature (Arzaghi and Henderson 
2005, Hooghe and Marks 2001, Land and Ersson 1999, Lijphart 1999, Treisman 2002, 
Woldendorp et al. 2000). Schakel (2008: 161) undertakes validity checks and conclude that “a 
comparison of the RAI with seven decentralization indices in the literature shows a great 
amount of agreement”. And more importantly, one of the main advantages of the RAI index is 
that compared to previous measures of decentralization it focuses on regional governments’ 
5 Self-Rule aggregates the following scales: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, and 
representation, while Shared-Rule aggregates law making, executive control, fiscal control, and constitutional 
reform. For a further description of each indicator see Hooghe et al. (2008).    
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political authority and completely excludes local governments. Given that we are interested in 
how legislative bargaining affects the distribution of political authority between the centre and 
the regions, the RAI index is an appropriate measure of decentralization. 
Main Independent Variable: Parliamentary Salience for Decentralization (PSD) 
To repeat it again, in this paper we aim to test whether or not the specific 
configuration of legislatures has any effect on the timing of political decentralization reforms 
in a given country. Since decentralization reforms are mainly legislative outcomes, we argue 
that the preferences and bargaining strength of parties in the legislature should be important 
factors to understand the passage of this sort of laws, in addition to the more traditional 
structural determinants. To address this hypothesis empirically we first need to have a 
measure of how salient it is the issue of decentralization in any given legislature. 
To do that, we used the CMP data (Budge et al. 2001) and picked the variables per301 
and per302, which code parties’ claims regarding decentralization in several party 
documents.6 The former measures quasi-sentences with a positive feeling about decentralizing 
the political structure of the country, whereas the latter accounts for the opposite (namely, 
negative views over decentralization). Simply subtracting per302 from per301 gives us the 
overall stance of each party on decentralization. Since the observation level of the dependent 
variable is not the party, we needed to transform this information into a measure of how 
salient the issue of decentralization was for the parliament as a whole. The resulting variables 
were three different specifications of the Parliamentary Salience for Decentralization (PSD).7 
First, we simply calculated the absolute (unweighted) average of the decentralization 
saliencies of the parties represented in Parliament which gives the Absolute Average PSD. 
Second, we weighted this average by the seat share of each party (Seat Share Weighted PSD). 
6 Though in a slightly different way, Benoit and Laver (2007) do also group per301 and per302 to account for 
the position of parties on the decentralization policy. 
7 Hereafter, PSD. 
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Certainly, parliamentary parties do not have the same potential to make their demands 
successful in legislative terms. This is why relying on the unweighted measure alone can be 
misleading. However, we claim that the legislative negotiation potential of a party is best 
captured through its bargaining power rather than its mere seat share. This is why we 
calculated the Banzhaf power indices (Penrose 1946) of each party in the CMP database and 
used it as a weight for parties’ decentralization preferences.8 The resulting measure is our 
main independent variable: Bargaining Power Weighted PSD. Having the above three 
measures allows to compare the performance of the latter (which we believe is the one that 
should better predict changes in the decentralization policy) against the other two in order to 
know which is the added value of incorporating political parties’ bargaining power in the 
























Where b reflects the Banzhaf index value of each party i of the n parties for which we 
had data in each legislature j, while d captures the preference of party i for or against 
decentralization (i.e. in CMP terms, per301–per 302). The temporal series of the variables 
Absolute Average PSD, Seat Share Weighted PSD, and Barg. Power Weighted PSD in our 
data are graphed by country in the following figure. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
8 The Banzhaf power index is defined by the probability of changing an outcome of a vote where voting rights 
are not necessarily equally divided among the voters (parties, in our case). To calculate the voting power of each 
party, all winning coalitions must be listed and then critical parties must be counted (that is, a party who, if it 
changed its vote, would cause the measure to fail). A party’s power is then measured as the fraction of all swing 
votes that it could cast. 
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In general, this figure shows that the weighted variables present more variability than 
the unweighted one. This is not surprising since the latter captures, only, changes in political 
parties’ preferences on the decentralization dimension from election to election. Instead, the 
weighted measures also incorporate political parties’ strength to the picture. Hence, they have 
two sources of variation, which increase their variability. Interestingly, keeping the content of 
political parties’ manifestoes constant across elections, there could be a dramatic change in 
our bargaining power weighted index with a fairly minor change in the seat share distribution. 
For instance, a parliament with a pro-centralization party close to the absolute majority but 
falling behind it could take a much higher Barg. Power Weighted PSD value than in the exact 
same situation but with that party having reached the 50% threshold (and that in principle 
could just be a matter of a couple of seats). In the latter case our measure would take exactly 
the value of the decentralization salience of that party. Spain provides again an interesting 
illustration of these differences. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Although the three measures follow a similar general trend, the differences between 
them are also obvious. First, the absolute average is always above the other two, reflecting the 
presence of numerous regional parties (who want more decentralization) in the different 
Spanish Parliaments. Since in this measure their preferences weigh the same as those of larger 
parties, the value of the index is pushed upwards. Comparing the two weighted measures, it is 
fairly clear that the changes in the bargaining power-weighted measure are sharper than in the 
seat share one. The segments in which the former is highest coincide with periods where none 
of the main two state-wide parties (“Partido Socialista Obrero Español” (PSOE) and “Partido 
Popular” (PP)) controlled the absolute majority of seats (1993-1996, 1996-2000, 2004-2008). 




As a first control, we include a variable capturing which is the social attitude towards 
decentralization. We do this by measuring the preferences for decentralization that the 
electorate showed in the last election. That is, which was the voting support received by the 
different partisan decentralization claims. The inclusion of the variable Electorate’s 
Preferences for Decentralization is important because it allows isolating the effect of our 
main independent variable (namely, legislative bargaining power for decentralization, which 
is logically endogenous to election results) from the preferences of the electorate. Obviously, 
in the empirical analyses we also include control variables to account for structural 
determinants of decentralization (Panizza 1999; Erk and Koning 2010). These controls are 
GDP per capita, inter-regional inequality, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, area, and level of 
democracy at the country-level. The first two are time-varying variables whereas the last four 
are time-invariant.9 However, these controls are not incorporated in all the models. 
The two time-varying controls are incorporated in some models only. The reason is 
that we have data for the whole time span both for the dependent variable and our main 
independent variable but not for all these controls. More specifically, for the inter-regional 
inequality control we use data on regional disparities recently gathered by Lessmann (2009).10 
His study analyses the effect of fiscal decentralization on inter-regional inequalities for 23 
OECD democracies from 1982 to 2000. Using data from Cambridge Econometrics, Lessmann 
(2009) develops several measures of inter-regional disparities. Here we use the coefficient of 
variation for regional income as our measure of Interregional Inequality. Controlling for 
regional disparities is crucial since previous research has highlighted a positive association 
between regional inequalities and decentralization of redistribution (Beramendi 2007a). There 
9 We treat our democracy level measure as an almost time-invariant control in our analyses. 
10 We thank Christian Lessmann for kindly making the data on inter-regional inequality available to us.  
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is no data for five countries and several years. Hence, we opted for presenting the full sample 
models without the controls, while a reduced sample is used when time-varying controls are 
included. 
Regarding the second time-varying control, both Panizza (1999) and Treisman (2006) 
provide evidence showing that economic development is associated with greater fiscal 
decentralization. To take this effect into account we include in our analyses the (Log of) GDP 
per Capita at constant 2000 US$ based on data from the World Development Indicators. 
As we shall see in the methodological section below, the most appropriate models 
given our data get rid of cross-country variability and, therefore, no time-invariant controls 
can be included. However, for robustness purposes, we run additional models in which their 
inclusion is possible. Specifically, we incorporate the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 
measure by Roeder (2001) for the year 1985. Ethnic diversity has been argued to be a 
structural determinant of fiscal decentralization (Erk and Koning 2010) and others like Marks 
et al. (2008) have documented an “identity effect” according to which individuals “prefer 
rulers who share their ethno-cultural norms”. Admittedly, though, this measure is rather crude 
since it does not capture territorial concentration and the strength of regional identities.11 
In addition, we include a measure of the (Log of) the Area of the country. Many 
previous studies on the origins of federalism and decentralization have highlighted country 
size as a structural determinant of decentralization (Panizza 1999; Erk and Swenden 2009). 
Marks et al. (2008) also find a “heteroskedasticity effect” according to which the variance in 
regional authority is greater in larger countries. The final (almost) time-invariant control is an 
institutional Democracy Indicator, which is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) derived 
from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall et 
11 This is a common problem across the literature on endogenous decentralization (Panizza 1999; Beramendi 
2007a; Erk and Koning 2010). 
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al. 2010). Panizza (1999) provided evidence of a positive association between democracy and 
fiscal decentralization. Although our sample includes advanced parliamentary democracies 
only, there are still some differences across countries in the mentioned indicator. This is why 
we include it in some of the analyses.  
Before turning to the methods section, we need to mention that the statistical analyses 
presented below are run in two differently structured datasets. The main analyses use a sample 
where legislatures are the observations. This obviously generated some problems to merge the 
different sources of data. The rule of thumb was to consider that the starting year of a 
legislature was the year after elections unless they were held before June 30th, in which case 
the election year and the legislature’s starting year coincide. The final year followed the same 
“half-a-year” logic. The variables for which we had data on a country-year basis were 
averaged through the legislature’s years except for the dependent variable, for which we were 
interested in the level of political decentralization that the parliament left at its dissolution. A 
second set of robustness analyses were run on a country-year sample, where the legislature-
dependent variables (such as the CMP ones) where expanded to meet this structure using, 
again, the “half-a-year” rule of thumb.12 
 
Methods: Dynamic Models 
Our hypotheses refer to a dynamic political process and the data we count on has a 
time-series-cross-section (TSCS) structure. Accordingly, we use several dynamic models to 
estimate dynamic effects and in particular to identify how certain configurations of the 
legislative make changes in the legislation regarding political decentralization more or less 
likely and in which direction. To do this, we pursued a twofold identification strategy, one for 
the analyses of cross-legislatures’ changes and another one taking yearly changes. 
12 For further details on this procedure, contact the authors. 
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Identification Strategy 1 (Legislatures) 
Since we want to estimate the effect of changes in our main independent variable on 
changes in our political decentralization index, we use first difference (FD) and Arellano-
Bond (AB) estimators. Given that our number of temporal observations is low (ranging from 
an average of 6.5 to 14.2 legislatures per country depending on the analysis), we make use of 
FD estimators to eliminate unit effects while avoiding bias in the estimations (Keele 2009). 
, , 1 , ,        ui t i t i t i tY Y Xφ β−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆  
We also estimate AB models, which extend the FD model. Given that the differenced 
residuals ,i tu∆  are uncorrelated with all ,i tY  and ,i tX from t–2 to longer lag lengths, we 
have used the second lag as instrument for , 1i tY −∆  in the equation above in our AB 
estimators. 
Identification Strategy 2 (Yearly) 
For robustness purposes, we also estimate Error Correction Models (ECM) as 
described in the equation below (Davidson et al. 1978). The main difference being that now 
the data has a country-year format instead of a legislature-based structure. ECM models are 
useful for two main purposes. First, ECM models are adequate for both stationary and non-
stationary data. And second, ECM models are useful to distinguish the dynamics of the effects 
–immediate versus steady state impacts– and hence to describe the temporal adjustments of 
the dependent variable (Beck and Katz 2009). The coefficients for the lagged variables in 
levels reflect the persistent effects, whereas the coefficients for the differenced variables 
capture the transitory effects. Note that the parameter for the lagged dependent variable 
should be between -1 and 0 to ensure equilibrium properties. 
, , , 1 , 1 ,      (  -  ) i t i t i t i t i tY X Y X uα β φ γ− −∆ = + ∆ + +  
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We estimate two types of ECM models. First, we run a standard ECM models using 
PCSE (Beck and Katz, 2009). We include both country and year dummies in order to account 
for unit effects and unobserved temporal shocks. Second, we include time-invariant controls 
by using the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition method (FEVD) developed by Plümper and 
Troeger (2004, 2007). This procedure is helpful as it enables the inclusion of theoretically 
interesting controls that otherwise cannot be included and hence accounts for remaining 
unobserved heterogeneity.13 The FEVD algorithm proceeds in three steps. It first estimates 
the unit effects by a baseline FE model excluding the time-invariant variables, afterwards it 
regresses the unit effects on the time-invariant variables, and finally it re-estimates the first 




Tables 1 and 2 display the estimates of the models predicting variations in the levels 
of the Regional Authority Index (RAI). The former presents data for nineteen countries while 
Table 2 loses five due to the inclusion of the economic controls. The main variable of interest 
in both tables is the Parliamentary Salience for Decentralization (PSD) measured in three 
different ways. The first-difference and Arellano-Bond estimators (FD and AB, respectively) 
show there is a relationship between the preferences of the parties in Parliament and actual 
political decentralization policy. However, the nature of this relationship depends on the 
measurement. Decentralization dynamics seem to respond, mainly, to changes in the 
bargaining power of parties claiming for more or less powers to the subnational entities.  
13 Note that Plümper et al (2007) argue that the FEVD is least biased estimator when time-variant and time-
invariant variables are correlated with the unit effects.  
 21 
                                                             
In Table 1, a greater PSD produces more decentralization only if we weight the 
preferences of political parties by their legislative bargaining strength. By contrast, 
preferences alone do not seem to explain much: an increase in the (unweighted) average PSD 
appears to have no influence on decentralization (AB estimator) or even a counter-intuitive 
negative effect (FD estimator). Similarly, when party preferences are weighted by their seat 
share, decentralization dynamics seem to be unrelated to changes in the configuration of the 
Parliament. However, it is when bargaining power is taken into account when the partisan 
preferences in Parliament impact actual political decentralization. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 2, where GDP per Cap. and Interregional Inequality are controlled for, the 
bargaining power weighted PSD continues to have the expected positive sign exerting a 
statistically significant influence on decentralization policy changes. Again, the other two 
measures perform worse, although the estimate of the seat share weighted PSD now reaches a 
90% level of statistical confidence. Read altogether, though, Tables 1 and 2 seem to suggest 
that the influence of political parties on decentralization is best captured through their 
bargaining power as defined by the Banzhaf index of voting power. 
It is true that our main independent variable –Barg. Power Weighted PSD– has two 
elements: the salience of parties’ preferences and their bargaining power, at the same time. 
Hence, a change in the variable could reflect either a change in the preferences of a party in 
parliament holding bargaining power constant or vice versa. As explained above, we are 
mainly interested in estimating how bargaining power helps political parties translate their 
preferences into actual policies. To disentangle this effect from the mere preference one, what 
we have done is to compare this measure with the absolute and seat share weighted ones. 
Given that the bargaining power weighted measure appears to perform better than the other 
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two (where preference change is also taken into account), we contend that bargaining power is 
crucial to understand how parties’ platforms finally affect policy once in parliament. 
Beyond the substantial independent variables, a brief mention of the control variables 
is also in order. Most notably, the preferences of the electorate regarding decentralization as 
measured through its voting behaviour increases the likelihood of decentralization policies in 
columns (1) only of Tables 1 and 2. However, when the weighted measures of PSD are 
included, the preferences of the electorate seem to be no longer relevant. Hence, controlling 
for which is the attitude of voters towards decentralization, the configuration of the parliament 
impacts how likely is the country to increase/decrease the level of decentralization. Note that 
the inclusion of the preferences of the electorate is important as it provides an argument 
against a possible critique of endogeneity. We take into account the preferences of the 
electorate and still we find an independent and remarkable legislative bargaining effect. 
Similarly, the other two controls included in Table 2 have a statistically significant 
effect on the dependent variable, but in some specifications only. In columns (4) and (6) of 
Table 2, a higher GDP per capita makes the passage of decentralization reforms more likely, 
while countries where regions are more unequal in economic terms are less prone to undergo 
this kind of reforms. The latter result is intuitively reasonable since the higher the disparity 
between regions, the more likely the poorest ones would veto decentralization. This finding is 
in line with the evidence provided by some earlier studies (Ezcurra and Pascual 2008), 
although it runs counter to the implications of other works related to this issue.14 At any rate, 
these effects disappear when instead of Arellano-Bond estimators, we use First-Difference 
ones. 
14 Lessman (2009), for instance, finds that higher decentralization is associated to lower interregional 
inequalities. That would indirectly imply that there is no reason for poor regions to stand against 
decentralization. 
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To increase our confidence in the statistical results provided above and check their 
robustness, we organized the data in a different way and repeated the analyses. While the 
observations in Tables 1 and 2 were each legislature in each country, in Table 3 the analyses 
are run in a dataset where each the observation is made in each year of the period analysed. 
The table reports the estimates of Error Correction Models (ECM) with panel-corrected 
standard errors (columns (1) and (3)) and with the Plümper-Troeger fixed effects vector 
decomposition three-step technique (columns (2) and (4)). Overall, the effect of changes in 
the PSD weighted by bargaining power seems to stand robustly across specifications. The 
coefficients have the expected positive sign and reach standard levels of statistical confidence. 
That suggests that an increase in the “power” of the PSD in parliament exerts a relevant short 
term or transitory effect the year after. However, as indicated by the lag of the variable (i.e. 
Barg. Power Weighted PSD (t-1)), the long-term effects do not resonate much and seem not to 
feed into subsequent years. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Apart from isolating short and long term effects, Table 3 also offers the fixed effects 
vector decomposition models, which make possible the inclusion of time-invariant and almost 
time-invariant controls. In one of the models we find that the more the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization of a country, the more decentralization reforms or the deeper they are. 
However, neither the degree of “democraticness” nor the size of the country seems to affect 
our dependent variable. Lastly, the coefficient for the greek letter eta (η) is statistically 
significant and with a value exactly equal to 1 (as it should be according to Plümper and 
Troeger (2004)). 
Finally, Table 4 explores further the nature of our dependent variable by splitting its 
components. It presents the full models both taking legislatures and years as temporal 
observations. Clearly, the evidence found for the dependent variable RAI seems to follow 
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what happens with one of its two main components: Self-Rule. Conversely, no systematic 
effect can be found for the other component: Shared-Rule. Therefore, it appears that changes 
in the configuration of the parliament in terms of parties’ preferences and bargaining power 
condition the negotiation over which should be the degree of authority that the regional 
government ought to exercise over those who live in the region. However, questions such as 
which should be the regions’ voice in the national institutions as a whole seem to be 
unaffected by parliamentary negotiations between political parties. This is an interesting 
finding. Whereas the intensity with which parties in parliament demand decentralization has 
an important effect on how likely it is the legislative passage of reforms giving regional 
governments more self-authority over the issues of the region, it does not have any impact on 
reforms giving regional authorities more influence on the country issues as a whole. This 
difference should certainly merit further attention in investigations to come. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Overall, we can conclude that our legislative bargaining weighted index of 
decentralization salience outperforms the unweighted average measure and the seat-share 
weighted one. The findings are well in line with the hypotheses posed above. Keeping all the 
traditional structural variables constant, there is an important additional political factor that 
determines the passage of decentralization reforms: the specific configuration of parties in 
parliament in terms of preferences and bargaining power. Hence, legislative bargaining does 




In this paper we have shown that legislative bargaining crucially shapes the dynamics 
of decentralization in parliamentary democracies. More specifically, we have argued that the 
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configuration of the national parliaments is a crucial determinant of changes in 
decentralization –something that has been largely overlooked in previous research (Treisman 
2006, Erk and Koning 2010). The preferences of political parties for and against 
decentralization, along with their legislative bargaining power, are here said to be important 
factors behind the implementation of reforms devolving (or subtracting) power to (from) 
regional entities.  
In order to test the hypotheses, we have used Hooghe et al.’s (2008) measures of 
political decentralization and merged them with information coming from CMP data to 
account for parties’ positions regarding decentralization. We have constructed a new index of 
Parliamentary Salience for Decentralization (PSD) that reflects parties’ preferences weighted 
by their legislative bargaining power –using the Banzhaf voting power index. After 
incorporating controls for structural determinants, the analyses have shown that, indeed, 
changes in the composition of national parliaments actually translate into decentralization 
reforms. Parliaments with higher average decentralization salience are more prone to 
decentralize. But most importantly, the specific distribution of bargaining power among 
parties in parliament makes a dramatic difference in explaining the dynamics of 
decentralization. Thus, the focus on legislative bargaining places us in a much better position 
to answer when and why countries decentralize in parliamentary democracies.  
All in all, we believe that future works willing to identify the political determinants of 
decentralization should direct their attention to parliaments and legislative politics. Here we 
have taken a step forward in this direction by looking at parties’ preferences and legislative 
bargaining power, but further efforts inquiring about other institutional characteristics of 
legislatures could certainly provide much insight in the study of countries’ decentralization 
policies. All this new line of research follows, in fact, Riker’s (1969) old advice arguing that 
in the study of federalism it is appropriate to focus on “the real forces in the political system”. 
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More generally, our approach shows that by taking into account the legislative bargaining 
power and the policy preferences of political parties it is possible to uncover the dynamics of 
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Table 2       
 FD AB FD AB FD AB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RAI (∆t-1 / t-1) 
-0.050 0.230 0.010 0.165 0.050 0.238** 
(0.088) (0.147) (0.090) (0.137) (0.091) (0.080) 
Absolute Average PSD (∆ / t) 
-0.610*** -0.229     
(0.182) (0.256)     
Seat Share Weighted PSD (∆ / t) 
  1.173* 2.690*   
  (0.643) (1.425)   
Barg. Power Weighted PSD (∆ / t) 
    0.235** 0.230* 
    (0.096) (0.112) 
Electorate’s Pref. for Decentralization 
(∆ / t) 
0.786*** 0.416 -1.009 -2.707* -0.009 -0.033 
(0.187) (0.393) (0.711) (1.415) (0.160) (0.245) 
Interregional Inequality (∆ / t) 
-8.381 -5.584 -10.719 -12.087** -11.687 -16.971** 
(8.312) (5.397) (8.680) (4.731) (8.576) (7.295) 
(Log of) GDP per Cap. (∆ / t) 
3.595 2.956 4.028 3.491* 4.714 3.206* 
(2.894) (2.503) (3.020) (1.877) (2.996) (1.546) 
Constant 0.173  0.088  0.002  (0.249)  (0.259)  (0.259)  
       
F (5,85 / 4,13) 3.89*** 0.79 2.17* 2.00 2.74** 4.85*** 
AB test or AR(1) Z  -1.33  -1.33  -1.55 
AB test or AR(2) Z  -0.70  -0.48  -0.83 
Observations 91 
Number of countries 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1       
 FD AB FD AB FD AB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RAI (∆t-1 / t-1) 
-0.011 0.775*** 0.021 0.817*** 0.032 0.826*** 
(0.057) (0.094) (0.057) (0.086) (0.057) (0.104) 
Absolute Average PSD (∆ / t) 
-0.284** 0.157     
(0.116) (0.536)     
Seat Share Weighted PSD (∆ / t) 
  0.241 1.237   
  (0.264) (1.174)   
Barg. Power Weighted PSD (∆ / t) 
    0.128** 0.227* 
    (0.060) (0.127) 
Electorate’s Pref. for Decentralization 
(∆ / t) 
0.314*** -0.078 -0.183 -1.210 -0.054 -0.163 
(0.109) (0.663) (0.279) (1.253) (0.071) (0.116) 
Constant 0.272***  0.253***  0.247***  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.077)  
       
F (3,265 / 2,18) 2.89** 39.31*** 1.16 34.62*** 2.43* 22.23*** 
AB test or AR(1) Z  -2.10**  -2.30**  -2.19** 
AB test or AR(2) Z  -1.03  -0.75  -0.94 
Observations 269 
Number of countries 19 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3     
  PCSE FEVD PCSE FEVD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
RAI (t-1) 
-0.051*** -0.079*** -0.142*** -0.181 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.049) (0.170) 
Barg. Power Weighted PSD (∆) 
0.110** 0.122*** 0.206*** 0.222*** 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.070) (0.073) 
Barg. Power Weighted PSD ( t-1) 
0.048 0.050 0.074 0.068 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.060) (0.085) 
Electorate’s Pref. for Decentralization 
(∆) 
-0.078 -0.091* -0.150 -0.160 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.107) (0.129) 
Electorate’s Pref. for Decentralization 
(t-1) 
-0.017 -0.012 0.069 0.080 
(0.033) (0.043) (0.072) (0.176) 
Interregional Inequality (∆) 
  1.426 -1.844 
  (4.453) (7.534) 
Interregional Inequality (t-1) 
  0.453 -0.070 
  (2.195) (8.480) 
(Log of) GDP per Cap. (∆) 
  1.336 1.624 
  (3.355) (6.503) 
(Log of) GDP per Cap. (t-1) 
  -0.334 0.487 
  (0.736) (1.109) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fract.  1.258**  2.936  (0.601)  (2.052) 
(Log of) Area  0.013  0.029  (0.069)  (0.205) 
Democracy Indicator  0.268  0.762  (0.291)  (1.548) 
η 
 1.000  1.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.777*** -2.033 3.318 -10.972 (0.275) (2.883) (6.392) (11.272) 
Country Dummies Yes FEVD Yes FEVD 
Year Dummies Yes No Yes No 
     
Observations 990 729 304 328 
Wald χ2(54 / 28) 175363.55***  19969.36***  
F(10,704 / 14,302)  3.53***  2.00** 
Number of countries 19 17  13  14 
Standard errors in parentheses     




Table 4         










  FD AB PCSE FEVD FD AB PCSE FEVD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Self Rule (∆t-1 / t-1 / t-1 / t-1) 
0.065 0.469 -0.126*** -0.167     
(0.090) (0.517) (0.046) (0.106)     
Shared Rule (∆t-1 / t-1 / t-1 / t-1) 
    0.027 0.373*** -0.126 -0.129 
    (0.111) (0.046) (0.113) (0.089) 
Barg. Power Weighted PSD 
(∆ / t / ∆ / ∆) 
0.215** 0.239* 0.194*** 0.211*** 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.012 
(0.083) (0.133) (0.069) (0.059) (0.040) (0.030) (0.010) (0.027) 
Barg. Power Weighted PSD 
( t-1) 
  0.063 0.060   0.010 0.003 
  (0.059) (0.062)   (0.008) (0.027) 
Electorate’s Pref. for 
Decentralization (∆ / t / ∆ / ∆) 
0.052 0.062 -0.129 -0.133 -0.060 -0.114 -0.023 -0.031 
(0.136) (0.168) (0.097) (0.100) (0.069) (0.118) (0.040) (0.043) 
Electorate’s Pref. for 
Decentralization (t-1) 
  0.080 0.095   -0.015 -0.018 
  (0.066) (0.113)   (0.025) (0.044) 
Interregional Inequality (∆) 
-10.493 -2.956 0.056 -2.876 -1.032 0.860 1.713 1.256 
(7.372) (11.906) (3.707) (5.303) (3.701) (0.791) (2.051) (2.518) 
Interregional Inequality (t-1) 
  -0.037 -0.918   0.805 0.906 
  (1.631) (4.395)   (1.044) (2.525) 
(Log of) GDP per Cap. (∆) 
4.007 1.382 0.688 1.474 0.643 -0.286 0.314 0.066 
(2.579) (2.737) (3.145) (3.542) (1.287) (0.429) (0.774) (1.768) 
(Log of) GDP per Cap. (t-1) 
  -0.342 0.572   -0.100 -0.147 
  (0.718) (0.600)   (0.135) (0.372) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fract.    1.554    0.848    (0.983)    (0.562) 
(Log of) Area    0.110    -0.064    (0.167)    (0.076) 
Democracy Indicator    0.495    0.174    (0.735)    (0.294) 
η 
   1.000    1.000 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
Constant 0.046  3.424 -10.331 -0.047  0.778 0.502 (0.222)  (6.283) (7.770) (0.111)  (1.048) (2.650) 
         
Observations 91 304 328 91 304 328 
F(5,85 / 4,13 / 14,302) 3.74*** 0.94  2.43*** 0.21 70.86***  0.74 
Wald χ2(28)   127995***    865***  
AB test or AR(1) Z  -1.00    -1.16   
AB test or AR(2) Z  0.48    -1.01   
Number of Countries 14 13 14 14 13 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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